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Abstract 
It is standard in the literature on training to use wages as a sufficient statistic for productivity. But there are 
many reasons why wages and productivity may diverge. This paper is part of a smaller literature on the effects 
of work-related training on direct measures of productivity. We construct a panel of British industries between 
1983 and 1996 containing training, productivity and wages. Using a variety of econometric estimation 
techniques (including system GMM) we find that training is associated with significantly higher productivity. 
Raising the proportion of workers trained in an industry by one percentage point (say from the average of 10% 
to 11%) is associated with an increase in value added per worker of about 0.6% and an increase in wages of 
about 0.3%. Furthermore, we find that the magnitude of the impact of training on wages is only half as large as 
the impact of training on productivity, implying that the existing literature has underestimated the importance of 
training. We also show evidence using complementary datasets (e.g. from individuals) that is suggestive of 
externalities of training and imperfect competition.  
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It is a widely-held view that Britain needs to increase work-related training to 
improve long-term economic performance and address the “skills gap”.
1 
Despite the policy interest and the huge economics literature on human 
capital there are hardly any papers that examine the impact of work-related 
training on direct measures of productivity. The primary contribution of our 
paper is to provide such evidence for the first time in the UK and for the first 
time anywhere over a long period (about 14 years). Analysis of the impact of 
training on productivity has focused almost entirely on estimating the impact of 
training on wages. Most studies looking at the private return to work-related 
training find that training results in workers receiving higher real wages
2.  
 
Although these studies are informative, they only tell half the story as they 
ignore the impact on the employer’s productivity. The relationship between 
wage increases and productivity gains can vary according to the structure of 
the labour and product markets and according to who actually pays the costs 
of training. In the simplest neoclassical view of the labour market where the 
market is perfectly competitive wages will be equal to the value of marginal 
product. Thus the wage can be taken as a direct measure of productivity. This 
simple relationship can break down for many reasons. For example, in 
Becker’s model of specific human capital the employer will pay for training so 
there should be no effect of completed training spells on observed wages 
even though there may be a large impact on productivity
3. 
                                            
1 See Green and Steedman (1997) or National Skills Task Force (1998). In the December 2003 Pre-
Budget Report, the British Chancellor justified the extension of the Employer Training Pilots in order 
to help improve the skills gap and UK productivity.  
(http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media//2E3BD/03_Meeting%20the%20Pro_EF.pdf) 
 
2 See Greenhalgh and Stewart (1987), Booth (1991, 1993) or Blundell et al (1996) for UK evidence. US 
studies using panel data include Lillard and Tan (1992), Lynch (1992), Blanchflower and Lynch (1992) 
and Bartel and Sicherman (1999).  Winkelmann (1994) uses German data and Bartel (1995) looks 
within a large US manufacturing company. 
3 There are many other reasons for a wedge between productivity and wage in a competitive labour 
market. First, employees may receive non-pecuniary benefits from training.  Second, workers may   3
 
If the labour market is characterised by imperfect competition then the strict 
link between wages and productivity is usually broken. Employees can find 
themselves being paid less (or more) than their marginal revenue product. 
Nevertheless it is still the case that conditional on a given degree of rent-
sharing or monopsony power increases in wages have to be paid out of 
productivity gains. Therefore we can assert the general principle that these 
real wage increases should provide a lower bound on the likely size of 
productivity increases. In practice the productivity gains are likely to be higher 
than this. For instance, in a labour market with frictions and some wage 
compression (e.g. from a binding minimum wage) there will be productivity 
gains even from general training that are not passed on to the employee in 
terms of wages but are only reflected in direct measures of productivity
4. 
Similar results can be found in some bargaining models (e.g. Booth et al, 
1999). 
 
There exist a small number of empirical papers that relate firm productivity to 
a measure of training
5. Although a positive correlation is generally found, it is 
very difficult to interpret because the training measures are only measured at 
a single point of time and could be picking up many unobservable firm specific 
factors correlated with both training and productivity. Black and Lynch (2001) 
use an establishment training survey at two points of time. In the cross section 
they identified some effects of the type of training on productivity, but they 
found no significant association when they controlled for plant specific effects.  
Ichinowski et al (1997) investigate what affects productivity in a panel of US 
                                                                                                                             
implicitly pay the costs of a training scheme the form of lower wages whilst being trained, which then 
rise after training is completed - so we might see a greater increase in observed  wages than in 
productivity. Third, employees’ wages could be lower during training because they are not contributing 
to firm productivity whilst actually being trained. Fourth, there may be deferred compensation 
packages where the employee’s remuneration is ‘backloaded’ towards later post-training years as a 
means of ensuring loyalty and/or effort early in the employee’s tenure (e.g. Lazear, 1979). 
4 See Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, 2003). 
5 Black and Lynch (1996), Bartel (1994), Barrett and O’Connell (2001), de Koning (1994), Boon and 
ven der Eijken (1997) and Ballot and Taymaz (1999)  have objective productivity measures. Bartel 
(1995), Holzer (1990) and Barron, Black and Lowenstein (1989) and Krueger and Rouse (1998) use 
subjective measures of productivity. Holzer et al (1993) do find effects of changes in productivity on 
changes in one measure of quality – the scrap rate.  
   4
steel finishing mills. After controlling for fixed effects they found a role for 
training only in combination with a large variety of complementary human 
resource practices.  Carriou and Jeger (1997), Ballot et al (1998) and Delame 
and Kramarz (1997) use French firm level panel data to look at the effects of 
training on value added and find positive and significant effects. Although 
these studies are broadly consistent with our own they do not fully exploit the 
potential of their panel data by allowing training to be a choice variable
6.  
 
Our contribution in this paper is to advance the literature in at least three 
ways. Black and Lynch (2001) emphasise the problems of trying to identify the 
effects of training in a short panel (they have only two separate training 
observations). Although unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for 
through fixed effects with only two periods, attenuation biases due to 
measurement error are exacerbated. To address this, we build a panel that 
contains up to fourteen consecutive years of training data. Second, we 
explicitly allow training to be a choice variable by using General Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators developed to deal with endogenous variables in 
production functions. Thirdly, we combine estimation of the productivity effects 
of training with estimation of the wage effects of training. Although 
comparisons between the production function and the wage equation are 
becoming more common for other worker characteristics such as gender and 
human capital this is the first time the strategy has been used for training
7. In 
principle this allows us to examine whether trained workers are paid the value 
of their marginal product. 
 
We conduct our main analysis of the effects of training at the industry level, 
rather (although we perform estimation at the firm and individual level for 
comparative purposes). There is simply no alternative to this strategy if one 
wishes to use long time series of training and productivity information. The 
                                            
6 See Greenhalgh (2002) for a much more extensive review of the French and UK literature in this area.  
7 Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske et al (1999), Hellerstein and Neumark (1999), Haegler and Klette 
(1999) and Jones (2001) examine the differential impact of human capital and gender on wages and 
productivity.  A recent study which utilises our methodology and looks at this question using a panel of 
French and Swedish firms is Ballot et al (2001, 2002). They find that in both France and Swedish firms 
appropriate a high proportion of the returns to training (82 and 67 per cent respectively).    5
only publicly available firm level panel data in the UK is a sample of about 119 
firms in the late 1990s with only very basic training information (a concise 
investigation of this is presented in Appendix B). Aggregation has pros and 
cons that are discussed in the paper. On the positive side, if there are 
important spillovers to training within an industry (e.g. through a faster rate of 
innovation) then a firm level analysis will potentially miss out these linkages 
and underestimate the return to human capital
8. On the negative side, there 
may be aggregation biases at the sectoral level that could lead to negative or 
positive biases on the training coefficient. We follow Grunfeld and Griliches 
(1960) in arguing that the pros outweigh the cons. 
 
The format of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the simple 
economic models of productivity and wages that we will estimate and section 
3 details the econometric strategy. The data are described in section 4 and 
the results are presented in section 5. Section 6 offers some concluding 
comments. The Appendices contain more information on the data and some 
additional experiments. Our main result is that we find a statistically and 
economically significant effect of training on industrial productivity. A 1 
percentage point increase in training is associated with about a 0.6 percent 
increase in productivity and a 0.3 per cent increase in hourly wages. The 
productivity effect of training is twice as large as the wage effect, implying that 




                                            
8 For example, O’Mahony (1998) finds that the coefficient on labour skills in a production function is 
more than twice that assumed by traditional growth accounting from relative wages. Other recent 
papers which have looked at the impact of human capital on directly measured productivity include 
Moretti (2004) on U.S. data and Haskel, Hawkes and Pereira (2003) on U.K. data.   6
2. A Model of training and productivity 
To see our approach assume that we can characterise a representative plant 




β αK AL Q =                                                    (1) 
 
where Q is value added, L is effective labour input allowing for quality and 
quantity dimensions, K is capital and A is a Hicks neutral efficiency parameter. 
 
We consider that trained workers are more productive than untrained workers, 
so that effective labour input can be written as 
 
        
T U N N L γ + =                                                (2) 
 
where N
U are the number of untrained workers, N
T are trained workers and γ is 
a parameter which, if trained workers are more productive than non-trained 
workers, will be greater than unity. The total number of workers, N, is equal to 
the sum of trained and untrained workers. Substituting equation (2) into 
equation (1) gives: 
β α α γ K N TRAIN A Q ) ) 1 ( 1 ( − + =                                     (3) 
 
Where  TRAIN = N
T/N, is the proportion of trained workers in an industry. 
Taking natural logarithms, we obtain 
 
K N TRAIN A Q ln ln ) ) 1 ( 1 ln( ln ln β α γ α + + − + + =                   (4) 
 
This could be estimated by non-linear least squares. If (γ−1)TRAIN is “small” 
we can use the approximation ln(1+x) = x and re-write the production function 
as
10:   7
 
K N TRAIN A Q ln ln ) 1 ( ln ln β α γ α + + − + =                                     (5) 
 
If the industry exhibits constant returns to scale (i.e. α+β=1) then equation (5) 
can be re-written in terms of labour productivity as 
 
) / ln( ) 1 )( 1 ( ln ) / ln( N K TRAIN A N Q β γ β + − − + =                                 (6) 
 
If the trained are no more productive than the untrained (γ =1) then the 
coefficient on TRAIN will be zero.  
 
This method can be easily extended to a larger number of different types of 
heterogeneous workers in the labour quality index. If we index the discrete 
type of labour by k  (where until now we have discussed k solely in terms of 
the training status of workers) then equation (4) can be written 
 
K N N N A Q k k
k
ln ln )] / )( 1 [( 1 ln( ln ln β α α γ + + − + + = ∑                     (7) 
 
Empirically we will allow for many other dimensions of labour quality such as 
education, occupation, age, tenure and gender
11.  There are a large number 
of other influences on productivity captured in A so we allow for differential 
hours, worker turnover rates, innovation (as proxied by research and 
development expenditures), regional composition and the proportion of small 
firms. Labeling these factors as X, imposing constant returns and using the 
log approximation the basic production function becomes: 
                                                                                                                             
9 This should be viewed as a first order approximation to a more complicated functional form. It is 
straightforward to generalize this to more complex functional forms such as translog and some 
experiments are included in the empirical results.   
10 The results were estimated both by non-linear least squares and by least squares using the 
approximation. The results did not significantly differ (see Table 3), so the more convenient log linear 
approximation is used for the baseline results. 
11 We follow Hellerstein et al (1999) by entering these variables in linear proportions. One could allow 
a larger number of cells for interactions of the labour quality variables (e.g. the proportion of educated 
men – a two way interaction, or the proportion of educated men who are trained –a three way 
interaction). We experimented with some breakdowns like this on the training variable, but LFS cell 
sizes by industry were generally not large enough.   8
 
X N K N N N Q k k
k
' ) / ln( )] / )( 1 [( ) 1 ( ) / ln( δ β β γ + + − − = ∑                             (8) 
 
The wage equation that we estimate parallels the productivity equation in (8). 
We view the wage equation as more of a descriptive regression than the 
structurally derived production function. Under competitive spot markets for 
labour relative wages should equal the relative marginal productivities of 
workers of different types. This is because if the relative productivity of trained 
workers (γ ) exceeded the relative wages of trained workers then employers 
would only employ trained workers (Hellerstein et al, 1999).  
 
Consider the wage bill (W) for the representative plant in an industry. Again, 
take the simplest model where there are only two types of workers: trained 
workers paid average wage w
T and untrained workers paid average wage 
w
NT. Relative wages are λ = w
T /w




T) + λ w
NTN
T     = w
NT(N+( λ-1) N
T)                          (9) 
 
In logarithms, the average wage (w) is 
 
) ) 1 ( 1 ln( ) / ln( ln TRAIN a N W w − + + = = λ                                     (10) 
 
where a = lnw
NT 
 
Clearly the coefficient on training can be used to recover the relative wage 
mark up associated with training (λ) and then compared to the relative 
productivity effect (γ). Parallel to the productivity equation we will allow for 
multiple type of labour quality and other factors to influence wages. The 
empirical wage equation to be estimated is therefore
12:  
                                            
12 One could argue that firm variables such as capital intensity and R&D should be excluded from the 
wage equation under competitive labour markets. However, these variables are typically quite 
informative in wage equations either because they are picking up some measure of unobserved labour 
quality (Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999) or because of departures from perfect competition. In either   9
 




' ln )] / )( 1 [( ln δ β λ + + − =∑                             (11) 
 
3 Econometric Modeling Strategy 
 
The basic equation we wish to estimate can be written in simplified form as  
it it it u x y + =θ                                                          (12) 
where  y is Q/N, and x is a vector of (suspected endogenous) variables 
including training. Subscript i indicates the representative firm in an industry t 
is time and θ is the parameter of interest. Assume that the stochastic error 
term, uit, takes the form 
 
it it it






                                                   (13) 
 
The  t τ  represent macro economic shocks captured by a series of time 
dummies,  i η is an individual effect, and  it υ  is a serially uncorrelated mean 
zero error term. The other element of the error term,  it ω  is allowed to have an 
AR(1) component (with coefficient ρ ) which could be due to measurement 
error or slowly evolving technological change  Substituting (13) into (12) gives 
us the dynamic equation 
 
it t i it it it it x x y y υ τ η π π π + + + + + = − −
* *
1 3 2 1 1                           (14) 
 
The common factor restriction (COMFAC) is  3 2 1 π π π − = . Note that 
t
* τ = 1 − − t t ρτ τ  and ηi*= (1-ρ )ηi . 
 
                                                                                                                             
case omitting such variables is likely to cause bias on the training variable and our baseline 
specifications will include them (although we also present experiments were they are dropped).   10
In main results section we present several econometric estimates of 
production functions (random effects, within groups and GMM). The most 
rigorous approach follows that recommended by Blundell and Bond (2000) 
that uses a “system GMM” approach to estimate equation (14) and then 
imposes the COMFAC restrictions by minimum distance. We now turn to 
describing the GMM approach in more detail. 
 
How should equation (14) be estimated? If training is strictly exogenous and 
there are no dynamics (i.e. ρ = 0), then the only problem with OLS estimation 
of (12) is the presence of the individual effects, i η . If these individual effects 
are uncorrelated with xit then the random effects estimator is unbiased and 
efficient. If the individual effects are correlated with xit but remain strictly 
exogenous then although the random effects estimator is biased, the within 
group estimator will be unbiased. 
 
If we allow training to be endogenous (i.e. allowing training decisions to react 
to shocks to current productivity) we will require instrumental variables. In the 
absence of any obvious natural experiments we consider moment conditions 
that will enable us to construct a GMM estimator for equation (14).  A common 
method would be to take first differences of (14) to sweep out the fixed effects:  
 
it t it it it it x x y y υ τ π π π ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − 1 3 2 1 1                                      (15) 
 
Since   it υ  is serially uncorrelated the moment condition  
0 ) ( 2 = ∆ − it it x E υ                                                           (16) 
ensures that instruments dated t-2 and earlier
13 are valid and can be used to 
construct a GMM estimator for equation (14) in first differences (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). A problem with this estimator is that variables with a high degree 
of persistence over time (such as capital) will have very low correlation 
between their first difference ( it x ∆ ) and the lagged levels being used an 
                                            
13 Additional instruments dated t-3, t-4, etc. Become available as the panel progresses through time.    11
instrument (e.g. 2 − it x ). This problem of weak instruments can lead to 
substantial bias in finite samples.  
 
Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that under a restriction on the initial 
conditions another set of moment conditions are available
14: 
  0 )) ( ( 1 = + ∆ − it i it x E υ η                                                         (17) 
This implies that lags of the first differences of the endogenous variables can 
be used to instrument the levels equation (14) directly. The econometric 
strategy is then to combine the instruments implied by the moment conditions 
(16) and (17). We stack the equations in differences and levels (i.e. (14) and 
(15)). We can obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients and use these to 
recover the underlying structural parameters in (12).  
 
The estimation strategy assumes the absence of serial correlation in the 
levels error terms ( it υ )
15. We report serial correlation tests in addition to the 




This GMM “system” estimator has been found to perform well in Monte Carlo 
simulations (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and in the context of the estimation of 
production functions (Blundell and Bond, 2000). The procedure should also be 
a way of controlling for transitory measurement error (the fixed effects control 
for permanent measurement error). Random measurement error has been 
found to be a problem in the returns to human capital literature, typically 
generating attenuation bias (see Card, 1999). 
                                            
14  The conditions are that the initial change in productivity is uncorrelated with the fixed effect   
0 ) ( 2 = ∆ i i y E η  and that initial changes in the endogenous variables are also uncorrelated with the 
fixed effect   0 ) ( 2 = ∆ i i x E η                                                       
15 If the process is MA(1) instead of MA(0) then the moment conditions in (16) and (17) no longer 
hold. Nevertheless  0 ) ( 3 = ∆ − it it x E υ and  0 )) ( ( 2 = + ∆ − it i it x E υ η  remain valid so earlier dated 
lags could still be used as instruments. This is the situation empirically with the wage equations. 
16  These are based on the first differenced residuals so we expect significant first order serial 
correlation but require zero second order serial correlation for the instruments to be valid. If there is 
significant second order correlation we need to drop the instruments back a further time period (this 
happens to be the case for the wage equation in the results below).   12
 
In order to assess the importance of biases associated with fixed effects and 
endogeneity we will estimate random effects, within groups and GMM 
estimates in the results section.  
 
Finally, consider two more issues which are harder to deal with: aggregation 
and training stocks vs. training flows. Estimation at the three digit industry 
level has advantages but also disadvantages relative to micro-level 
estimation. The production function in equation (1) at the firm level describes 
the private impact of training on productivity. However, many authors, 
especially in the endogenous growth literature (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1998), 
have argued that there will be externalities to human capital acquisition. For 
example, workers with higher human capital are more likely to generate new 
ideas which may spill over to other firms
17. If spillovers are industry specific 
this implies that there should be additional terms added to equation (5) 
representing training in other firms (e.g. the mean number of trained workers 
in the industry). In this case the coefficient on training in an industry level 
production function should exceed that in a firm level production function
18. 
Secondly, grouping by industry may smooth over some of the measurement 
error in the micro data and therefore reduce attenuation bias.  
 
On the negative side, there may be aggregation biases in industry level data. 
A priori it is not possible to unambiguously sign these biases. We expect that 
the fixed effects will control for some of the problem. For example, we are 
taking logs of means and not the means of logs in aggregating equation (4), 
but so long as the higher order moments of the distributions are constant over 
time in an industry then they will be captured by a fixed effect
19. If the 
coefficients are not constant across firms in equation (4), but are actually 
random, this will also generate higher order terms at the industry level. In the 
                                            
17 Although there are many papers which examine externalities of R&D (e.g. see the survey by 
Griliches, 1992) and a few which look at human capital (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000 and Moretti, 
1999) there are none that focus on training spillovers.  
18 For the same argument in the R&D context see Griliches (1992) 
19 If they evolve at the same rate across industries they will be picked up by the time dummies.   13
empirical results we experiment with including higher order moments and 
allowing the coefficients to vary across cross sectional units. 
 
Turning to the problem of training stocks and flows, note that the model in 
equation (1) assumes that we know the stocks of trained workers in an 
industry. What we actually have in the data is an estimate of the proportion of 
workers in an industry who received training in a given 4-week period (the 
training flow). Since individuals are sampled randomly over time in the LFS 
this should be an unbiased estimate of the proportion of people in training in 
given industry in a given year
20. As an alternative to using the flow we 
calculate a stock of training in an analogous way to using investment flows to 
calculate a capital stock through the perpetual inventory method (the main 
form of depreciation is the turnover rate). This is described in the Data 
Appendix. 
 
4. Data Description  
The database we construct combines several sources (see Data Appendix for 
full details). The critical individual level source is the individual level UK 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) which contained about 60,000 households per 
year. Most importantly, the LFS has a consistent training measure since 1984 
as well as detailed information on skills, demographics, hours worked, tenure 
and wages. We work with this information aggregated by broadly three digit 
industries. The LFS only started asking questions on wages at two points of 
time in 1997 (and at one point of time in 1992 when the panel was set up). We 
present some individual level panel wage regressions at the end of section 5 
for comparison. 
 
The second major dataset we use is the Annual Census of Production 
(ACOP). This gives production statistics on capital, wages, labour and output 
                                            
20 If there are many multiple training spells in the month we will underestimate the proportion of 
employees who are being trained. If Spring (the LFS quarter we use) is a particularly heavy training 
season then we will overestimate the proportion being trained in a year. These biases are likely to be 
small and offsetting.   14
for industries in the production sector (manufacturing, mining and utilities). For 
the services industries we drew on the OECD’s ISDB data. 
 
There was a change in SIC classification in 1992 which forced us to 
aggregate some of the industries and prevented us from using some of the 
industries after the change. Additionally, we insisted on having at least 25 
individuals in each cell in each year. After matching the aggregated individual 
data from LFS we were left with 94 industry groupings over (a maximum of) 
14 years.  
 
The main LFS training question was, “over the 4 weeks ending Sunday … 
have you taken part in any education or training connected with your job, or a 
job that you might be able to do in the future?”
21 The average proportions of 
employees undertaking training grew steadily from about 8% in 1984 to 14% 
in 1990 where it stabilized for the next 6 years. Most of this growth was 
upgrading within industry rather than between industries
22.  
 
Figure 1 gives the scatterplot of labour productivity (log real value added per 
worker) against training propensity and Figure 2 repeats the exercise for log 
hourly wages.  Unsurprisingly training has a strong positive correlation with 
both variables, but the association is somewhat weaker for wages than for 
productivity.  
 
The outliers in both graphs tend to be in the service sector. Unfortunately, the 
published series for real value added and capital stocks are rather unreliable 
in the service sector. For example in banking and financial services measured 
real value added per person declined every year between 1983 and 1996.  
Given the poor quality of the service sector production data we reluctantly 
decided to focus the econometric part of the analysis on the production side of 
the economy. This is still a substantial share of the economy about 50% of 
                                            
21 Unfortunately it is not possible to separate out “education” from “training”. 
22 There is also a question of the length of the training spell, but this was only asked in particular years 
and there were too many missing values to use it as a separate regressor. Median spell length was two 
weeks and the mean higher.   15
private sector net output in 1986.
23 Until robust measures of service sector 
productivity are developed there is simply no alternative to the empirical 
strategy of focusing on the production sector. 
 
Care must be taken in interpreting the scatterplots presented in Figures 1 and 
2 as they say nothing about the causal impact of training on productivity or 
wages. Table A1 in the Data Appendix shows that high training industries are 
characterized by higher fixed capital intensity, more professional workers, 
more educated workers and higher R&D. We need to turn to an explicit 
econometric model to investigate whether there is a causal effect of training 
on productivity and this forms the focus of the rest of the paper. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline Industry Results 
In Table 1 we present the basic results for the industry-level regressions 
treating all variables as exogenous. The first three columns have productivity 
(log real value added per head) as the dependent variable and the last three 
columns have wages as the dependent variable.  
                                            
23  This lead to the loss of only 91 observations and the results are robust to including the service sector 
in the unweighted regressions. We generally weight the regressions by the number of LFS observations 
in order to reduce sampling variability. In the weighted regressions including the service sector does 
have more substantial effects on the results because of their large employment shares. Full sets of these 
results are available on request from the authors.   16
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Notes to Figures 1 and 2 
Each point is an industry-year observation; the OLS regression line has a slope of 4.91 for productivity 
and 2.95 for wages; labour productivity is  log(Value added per employee); Wages are log hourly wages 
from the Census of Production (wages) and the LFS (hours); training  is the proportion of workers 
involved in training from the LFS   17
 
The first two columns are estimated by random effects; the only difference is 
that column (1) does not include the occupational controls. This makes some 
difference to the “no qualifications” variable which has a significantly negative 
association with productivity in the first column, but is insignificantly different 
from zero in the second column – the occupational proportions (especially the 
professional/managerial category)) do a better job at proxying for workforce 
skill than education
24. The variables generally take their expected signs, 
although it is clear that there is some loss of precision when a full set of fixed 
effects is added in column (3). Capital per worker is strongly correlated with 
productivity, although the coefficient is lower (0.21 to 0.25) than capital’s 
share of value added which is about 30%. Worker turnover has a significantly 
negative association with productivity and R&D a significantly positive 
correlation. Younger workers (aged between 16 and 24) are significantly less 
productive than the 35-45 year old group. 
 
Most importantly for our purposes, training has a statistically significant and 
economically important effect on productivity according to Table 1. The 
magnitude of the coefficient falls as we move to the more rigorous 
specification that controls for fixed effects, but the change is not dramatic. The 
estimates imply that raising the training variable by 1 percentage point (say 
from the 1996 economy wide mean of about 14% to 15%) is associated with 
an increase in productivity of about 0.7%. We will return to the plausibility of 
the magnitude of these effects in sub-section 5.3. 
 
The last three columns repeat the specifications but instead use ln(earnings) 
as the dependent variable. The most interesting contrast for our purpose is 
the coefficient on training. As with productivity, training enters the earnings 
equation with a consistently positive and significant coefficient across all three 
columns. The magnitude of the coefficient in the wage equation is much lower 
                                            
24 This conclusion does not change if we break down the qualifications into four groups. Machin et al 
(2003) adopt a much finer classification of education using post 1992 LFS data where there are a larger 
number of observations. Exploiting the regional and industry aspect of the aggregated data they find 
some role for college proportion, even in fixed effect specifications.    18
than in the productivity equation – just under half the size, in fact. On face 
value, then, estimating the returns to training solely on the basis of wage 




Turning to the other variables in the wage equation, the signs of most of the 
variables are the same as those in the productivity equations, although there 
are some differences. As expected, earnings are significantly higher in more 
capital intensive, hours intensive and highly skilled industries.  The R&D 
coefficient is surprisingly negative (although insignificantly different from zero), 
but this turns out to be because of mis-specified dynamics – including longer 
lags of R&D demonstrates there is actually a positive correlation of technology 
with wages
26 (see Table 2). 
 
An important concern with Table 1 is that we do not allow for the endogeneity 
of training or other suspected endogenous variables. To deal with this we 
implemented the GMM approach described in section 3 above. Table 2 
contains a summary of the main results
27. All the same variables are included 
in these regressions as in Table 1, but we report only the key coefficients to 
preserve space.  
                                            
25 Explicit tests of the equality of the coefficients on training in the wage and productivity equations 
was rejected at the .10 level for training (p-value = .068). This calculation allows for correlation 
between the wage equation and the production function using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (note 
that jointly estimating by SUR is no more efficient than OLS in this context because all independent 
variables enter both equations). The equality of coefficients on R&D, turnover and capital intensity was 
also rejected at the 0.05 level. 
26 Consistent with the findings of inter alia Bartel and Sicherman (1999) 
27  Data  Appendix Table B2 has more detailed results and even more detailed specifications are 
available from authors or in Dearden et al (2000)   19
 
Table 1 Training, Productivity and Wages 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Ln(Value added per worker)  Ln(Wages) 










          






























































Occupations: Base group is manual workers 












































Experience: Base Group is Age 35-45 








































































          
Observations  968  968 968 968 968 968 
Estimation  Period 1984-1996 1984-1996 1984-1996 1984-1996 1984-1996 1984-1996 
 
Notes:  
Standard errors (robust to heteroskedacity) in parentheses under coefficients. Bold typeface indicates 
that the variable is significant at the 5% level. Variables that are significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
All regressions include a full set of regional dummies (10), time dummies (12) and tenure dummies (6); 
observations are weighted by number of individuals in an LFS industry cell. Random effects are 
estimated by GLS. Within groups estimated by least squares dummy variables (85 industries).    20
 
In column (1) we present the production function and in column (2) we present 
the wage equation. The GMM estimates tell a similar story to the within 
groups estimates. Training has a positive and significant impact on both 
productivity and wages, although the training coefficient in the production 
function remains almost twice the size of the coefficient in the wage equation 
(0.60 vs. 0.35). There are some minor changes to the other coefficients – the 
coefficient on capital intensity has risen to 0.33 in the production function, the 
R&D coefficient is positively signed in the wage equation and the coefficient 
on hours is somewhat larger in magnitude than in Table 1.  
 
The diagnostics reported at the base of the table are also satisfactory – there 
is no sign of second order serial correlation (in the first differences residuals) 
and the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject. Note that 
the wage regression uses instruments dated t-3 and before in the differenced 
equation (and dated t-2 in the levels equation). This is because there were 
some signs of significant second-order serial correlation using t-2 dated 
instruments in the wage equation which invalidates the IVs (we dropped one 
period in order to be able use the longer lags in estimation). Using the (invalid) 
instruments on the longer time period gave a coefficient (standard error) on 
training of 0.141(0.067) in the wage equation
28. 
                                            
28  Using the shorter time period with longer dated instruments in the production function gave a 
coefficient (standard error) on training of 1.043(.325). See Table B2 in the Appendix for full details.   21
 
Table 2 Production Functions and Wage Equations estimated by GMM 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  ln(real value added per worker)  Ln(Wages) 
Training  .602 
(.181) 
           .351 
          (.106) 














Proportion employees who are 
























Sargan(d.f.) 8.819(121)  11.83(136) 
Instruments  (TRAIN)t-2,t-3, Ln(Q/N)t-2,,t-3,  
ln(Hrs/N)t-2,t-3 ln(K/N)t-2,t-3  in 
differenced equations; ∆(TRAIN)t-1, , 
∆ln(Hrs/N)t-1  ∆ln(K/N)t-1 in the levels 
equations. 
(TRAIN)t-3,..,t-5, Ln(Q/N)t-3,..,t-5,  
ln(Hrs/N)t-3,...t-5, ln(K/N)t-3,...t-5  in 
differenced equations; ∆(TRAIN)t-2,  
∆ln(Hrs/N)t-2  ∆ln(K/N)t-2 in the levels 
equations. 
 
Estimation Period  1984-1996 1985-1996 
Observations  898 883 
 
Notes: 
Estimation by GMM-SYS in Arellano and Bond (1998) DPD-98 package written in GAUSS, one step robust 
estimates reported; all regressions include the current values of all the variables in Table 1 columns (3) and (6) (i.e. 
turnover, other occupations, qualifications, age, tenure, gender, region, firm size and time dummies). Capital 
intensity, training, hours and lagged productivity are always treated as endogenous. The other variables are 
assumed weakly exogenous. One step standard errors (robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form) in parentheses under coefficients (variables significant at 5% level 
are in bold); LM1(2) is a Lagrange Multiplier test of first (second) order serial correlation distributed N[1,0] 
under the null (see Arellano and Bond, 1991); Sargan is a Chi-squared test of the over-identifying restrictions; 
observations weighted by number of individuals in an LFS industry cell. Full details in Table B2.   22
 
 
Table 3 Robustness Tests of the Production Function 
 
Row  Robustness test  NT  Training coefficient 
(standard error) 
1  Original training coefficient in production sector, Table 1 
column (3) 
968   0.696(0.201)
2  Using “stock” of trained workers instead of flows  968  0.775(.189) 
  
3  Using the balanced panel only to check for bias associated with 
finite T (Nickell, 1981) 
572 0.508(0.289) 
4  Conditioning on wage in productivity regression (to control for 





5  Including service sectors  1059  0.727(0.206) 




7  Allow all industries to have different training coefficients  968  mean of 
heterogeneous 
coefficients: 0.510 
8  Allow non-constant returns  968  0.725(.201) 
9  Estimating a translog production function  968  0.703(.201) 
 
10  Estimation by non-linear least squares  968  0.518(.197) 
11  Estimation on 1993-2001 data (region-industry cells)  1873  0.436(.188) 
 
Notes  
These all use the specification in the third column of Table 1 (unless otherwise specified). Estimation 
by within groups, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
5.2 Robustness of the Results 
We conducted a large number of robustness tests on the models in these 
tables. Table 3 reports some of these. Given the similarity of the within groups 
and GMM results we performed these tests on the within groups specifications 
of table 1 (column (3)). The first row of Table 3 simply reports the coefficient 
and standard error from this table. Using the stock of trained employees 
instead of the flow (calculated allowing for depreciation due to inter-firm 
turnover) results in very similar results in row 2
29. Keeping only industries 
                                            
29 The non-fixed effects results were significantly different, but the deviations around the fixed effect in 
the training stock are dominated by the flow, explaining the similarity of the results. In addition to 
using the empirical turnover rates we assumed an exogenous depreciation of training at 40% per annum 
(see Data Appendix). The coefficient was stable to reasonable changes in these parameters (e.g. 
increasing the depreciation rate to 50% p.a. increased the coefficient to 0.81, to 60% to 0.82. 
Decreasing the depreciation rate to 30% reduced the coefficient to 0.70).    23
which had fourteen continuous years of data (balanced panel) in row 3 means 
losing 40% of the observations; the coefficient falls, but the change is not 
significant. The fourth row includes average wages on the right hand side of 
the production function as a measure of unobserved worker quality. Although 
wages have a positive and significant coefficient, the training association 
remains robust.  In row 5 we include all the service sectors, ignoring our 
concerns over data quality. The coefficient on training rises to 0.73 and 
remains significant (although the standard error is higher). 
 
Since training is correlated with unionisation, we could be picking up 
“collective voice” effects in the main results. Union membership is only 
available in LFS since 1989. Despite the loss in sample in row 6, the training 
effect is robust to inclusion of union density (density is insignificantly 
negatively associated with productivity).  In row 7 we allow the training effect 
to be different in each of the 85 industries. The mean of these heterogeneous 
coefficients is close to the pooled results. The next two rows allow for more 
general functional forms relaxing first constant returns (row 8) and then 
estimating a translog production function (row 9). In both cases the training 
coefficient is essentially unchanged. Row 10 gives the results from a non-
linear least squares estimation (equation 8 in section 2) again showing no 
significant difference.  
 
We also compared our results with a recent paper (Machin et al, 2003) that 
has built up similar data to our own covering a more recent period and 
exploiting the larger size of the LFS post 1992 to construct industry by region 
cells. Against these advantages their dataset has a shorter time series 
component (1993-2001) and lacks some of the covariates we use. Re-
estimating identical specifications on their dataset gives an estimate of the 
training association with productivity of 0.436 with a standard error of 0.188 
(see row 11 of Table 3). This is lower, but is still significant and remains well 
within two standard errors of our main results.
30 On our dataset we tested 
                                            
30 The specification is identical to table 1 column (3) except we drop the occupational proportions and 
R&D and include employment. On our data this gives a coefficient (standard error) on TRAIN of 
.732(.205).    24
whether there was a tendency for the training coefficient to fall (or rise) over 
time in the production function, but we found it to be stable
31. 
 
Does the “wedge” between the wage and productivity effect of training arise 
from specific human capital or imperfect competition? Under most forms of 
imperfect competition, we conjectured that the wedge would be larger in those 
industries where workers were earning less than would be implied by their 
human capital (i.e. inter-industry wage premia were low). This could be 
because the “low paying” industries were monopsonistic with large search 
frictions or because workers are more able to capture the quasi-rents from 
training in the “high paying” industries.  
 
In order to identify such industries we used estimates of inter-industry wage 
premia taken from the US Current Population Survey
32. We matched the US 
industries to the UK industries and split the sample at the median sectoral 
wage premia. Allowing an interaction between training and this industry split 
revealed that the wedge between the training effect on productivity and the 
training effect on wages was solely within the “low wage” industries. To be 
precise, including an interaction in the wage equation between training and 
low wage industries gave a coefficient (standard error) of -0.664(0.196) on the 
interaction and 0.531(0.113) on the linear training effect. In the production 
function the interaction was 0.332(0.297) - positive but insignificant. In other 
words, in the “high wage premium” industries there was no significant 
difference between the impact of training on productivity and the impact of 
productivity on wages.  The fact that our results are driven by the wedge in 
low paying sectors is tentative evidence in favour of a monopsony/search 
interpretation.  
 
                                            
31 For example interacting TRAIN with a trend in the production function gave a coefficient of .003 
with a standard error of .044. 
32 Estimating inter industry wage premia from UK wages would have been more problematic as these 
could reflect endogenous influences – US wage setting will be driven by the structural characteristics 
of the industries in question. These US wage inter industry wage premia were generated from 
individual level wage regressions from the 1986 CPS Merged Outgoing rotation files. The wage 
regressions included years of schooling, a quartic in experience, gender, marital status,   25
This evidence is open to the critique that firm specific training may be 
systematically more prevalent in the low wage sectors (although a priori the 
usual view is that “good jobs” are more likely to have more specific skills). 
There are several questions in LFS that could be interpreted as general vs. 
specific training, so we used them to see if the coefficients differed 
significantly with training type - they did not. For example there are questions 
related to off the job training (more general) and on-the-job training (more 
specific). The proportion of off the job training produced a coefficient (standard 
error) of 0.005(0.018) when added to the wage regression and a coefficient 
(standard error) 0.018(0.029) when added to the production function. We view 
this not as any rejection of specific human capital theory per se, but rather 
because the type of human capital is intrinsically difficult to measure. 
Furthermore, the LFS questions are not asked in all years and have many 
missing values.  
 
5.3 Quantifying the effects of Training  
Our key qualitative conclusions are first, that there is a significant impact of 
training on productivity and second, that the effects of training on productivity 
are larger than the effects of training on wages. But quantitatively, how 
economically significant is the magnitude of the training effect?  
 
Interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients is difficult, but the implied effects 
are large. From Tables 1 and 2 we conservatively take the coefficient on 
training in the productivity regressions to be about 0.6 and the coefficient on 
training in the wage regressions to be about 0.3. This would imply a 10 
percentage point increase in the training measure is associated with a 6% 
increase in productivity and a 3% increase in wages.  
 
Relative to the returns to schooling literature the training impacts appear 
high
33 (although Dearden et al, 2000, show that our estimates of the training 
effects on wages are actually quite low compared to existing UK estimates 
                                                                                                                             
gender*marriage interactions, race, SMSA and regional dummies. The data were kindly provided by 
Steve Pischke (see Acemoglu and Pishcke, 2002, for details).   26
such as Booth, 1993, and Blundell et al, 1996). Card (1999) puts the impact of 
a year of schooling on wages at about 10%, so our baseline impact of 0.3 is 
about three times as large. Given that the typical time in training during the 
four week period is under a month (the median is two weeks, the average is 
higher), the returns to a month of training appear even more impressive. For 
example an increase in our key variable, TRAIN, of 10% would imply a typical 
worker only spent 5% extra of his time in training if training spells were on 
average 2 weeks long. 
 
Of course, there may be remaining econometric problems we have still not 
controlled for generating this difference. But assuming the training effect is not 
a statistical artifact there remain at least two possible explanations for the 
larger size of the training coefficients compared to conventional estimates of 
the return to schooling. First, work-related training may have a higher private 
return than schooling as training is more directed at raising productivity in 
employment. Training is also likely to have a faster rate of depreciation than 
schooling, so it requires a higher year on year return in order to give 
incentives for investment
34. Secondly, there may be externalities associated 
with training that are missed in the conventional schooling literature which 
focuses on private returns whereas we look at returns to the industry as a 
whole (cf. Moretti, 2004). 
 
To investigate the externality issue we estimated some individual level wage 
regressions on the LFS panel. If the private returns to training are higher than 
the social returns we might expect to see a similarly high coefficient in the 
individual level wage regression. We used the individual level equivalents of 
the variables in the industry level regressions. To construct the proportion of 
the year spent in training we used the LFS panel which follows individuals for 
5 quarters and asks individuals the training question in each quarter. We 
defined a dummy variable (TRAIND4) indicating whether the individual had 
                                                                                                                             
33 Compared to existing UK estimates of the training effects on wages (e.g. Booth, 1993 and Blundell 
et al, 1996) our estimates are actually lower (see Dearden et al, 2000, for a detailed comparison). 
34 See Heckman et al (2003) for a recent discussion of interpretation of the schooling coefficient in 
wage regressions.   27
been involved in some training in all of the previous four quarters. We also 
defined dummies for if the individual had been in training for 3 quarters 
(TRAIND3), 2 quarters (TRAIND2), one quarter (TRAIND1) or not at all 
(TRAIND0). Using TRAIND0 as the omitted base the results we obtained from 




TRAIND TRAIND TRAIND wage
+ +
+ + =
1 ) 015 (. 078 .
2 ) 019 (. 125 . 3 ) 023 (. 092 . 4 ) 033 (. 165 . ) ln(
 
 
Longer lengths of time in training are associated with significantly higher 
wages
36. The coefficient on receiving training in all four quarters is 0.165; this 
is comparable with the industry level coefficient of 0.350. Taken literally this 
would suggest that about half of the impact of training on wages at the 
industry level is attributable to externalities.           
 
If we include a set of industry dummies (which will include potential spillovers) 
the coefficient on TRAIND4 falls from 0.16 to 0.13. If we also include the initial 
wage in the first quarter (to control for unobserved heterogeneity) then the 
coefficient falls even further to 0.079. So these impacts of a “year” of training 
are rather similar to the conventional impacts of the returns to a year in 
school.   
 
Our conclusion from this exercise is that the larger magnitude of the training 
effects in this paper primarily reflects our strategy of estimating at a level 
above the individual worker. This was forced upon us by the absence of 
adequate data on firm productivity and training, but also because of our desire 
to incorporate externalities. The results are therefore consistent with a story 
which stresses externalities to training. 
 
                                            
35 Estimation was by OLS with robust standard errors are in parentheses. Controls include gender, age, 
areas (20), employer size, occupational dummies (8), no qualification dummy, and a dummy for part-
time status. Results are for the production sector only. The quarterly LFS panel 1997-1998 was used as 
two wage observations per individual did not exist in the LFS prior to this. There were 3998 
observations and full results available on request from the authors.    28
Even if there remain econometric problems that have caused us to have 
overestimated the impact of training at the industry level, it is hard to see why 
this would not also bias upwards the training coefficient in the production 
function and wage equations to a similar extent. Therefore, even if one 
disputes the exact quantitative magnitude of the training effect, our key 
qualitative conclusion that the productivity impact of training is much greater 
than the wage impact should still be valid (that is also a feature of the firm 
level results in Appendix B). 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the issue of the impact of private sector 
training on productivity. Rather than simply use wages as a measure of 
productivity we present (for the first time) estimates of the impact of training 
on productivity over a long time period.  We have assembled a data set which 
aggregates individual level data on training and establishment data on 
productivity and investment into an industry panel covering 1983-1996. We 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and the potential endogeneity of training 
using a variety of methods including GMM system estimation. 
 
Using this new data, we identify a statistically and economically significant 
effect of training on value added per head in the UK. An increase of one 
percentage point in the proportion of employees trained is associated with 
about a 0.6% percent increase in productivity and a 0.3% increase in wages.  
 
We argued that the methodologies in the existing literature may underestimate 
the importance of training. The focus on wages as the only relevant measure 
of productivity ignores the additional productivity benefits the firm may 
capture. Throughout our results we found that the overall effect of training on 
productivity was around twice as large as the effects on wages (even using 
firm level data). This result could occur even under standard specific human 
capital theory. But it could also arise for a number of other reasons due to 
                                                                                                                             
36 The training effects are not monotonic. There is even a perverse fall in the coefficient on being in 
training 3 relative to 2 quarters, although the coefficients are not significantly different.   29
imperfect competition in the labour market (and we present some evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis). Clearly further research is needed to 
distinguish between these different theories. 
 
Finally, a comparison between the industry and individual level wage 
regressions suggests that our industry level analysis may capture externalities 
from training that are missed out in the micro-level studies. An important 
avenue of future research would include probing the returns to training by 
combining enterprise data with industry-level data to investigate the 
externalities story in greater detail.    30
A. Data Appendix  
A.1 Data construction for industry panel 
The database we construct combines several sources. The critical individual 
level source is UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) which covered. LFS is a large-
scale household interview based survey of individuals in the UK which has 
been carried out on varying bases since 1975
37. Around 60,000 households 
have been interviewed per survey since 1984. The LFS data are useful for our 
purposes as they contain detailed information on: 
•  the extent and types of training undertaken by employees in the survey; 
•  personal characteristics of interviewees (e.g.  age, sex, region); 
•  the skills of individuals (educational qualifications and occupation); 
•  some basic workplace characteristics (e.g. employer size, industry); 
•  job characteristics of employees (e.g. job tenure, hours of work). 
 
We work with this information aggregated into proportions and/or averages by 
(broadly) three digit SIC80 industry. Our sample includes all employed men 
and women aged between 16 and 64 inclusive (i.e. employees plus the self-
employed) for whom there was information on the industry under which their 
employment was classified. 
 
The main training question asked to employees in the Labour Force Survey 
between 1983 and 1996 was, “over the 4 weeks ending Sunday … have you 
taken part in any education or training connected with your job, or a job that 
you might be able to do in the future … ?” Figure A.1 below shows the 
average proportions of employees undertaking training in each year of the 
LFS sample. It shows a reasonably steady increase in the proportion of 
employees in the LFS receiving training in the 1980s
38. From 1990 onwards, 
the proportion of employees receiving training stabilises at around 14% and 
stays at or around this level for the rest of the sample period.  
 
We did some simple decomposition analyses to investigate whether the 
increase in aggregate training was due to the growth in size of industries 
which are (and always have been) relatively more training intensive. It turns 
out that this is only a minor factor: over 95% of the increase in aggregate 
training is due to an increase within a large number of different sectors
39. This 
                                            
37 Between 1975 and 1983 the survey was conducted every two years; from 1984 until 1991 it was 
conducted annually. Since 1992 the Labour Force survey has been conducted every three months in a 
five-quarter rolling panel format. 
38 It should be noted that the figure of around 5% for 1983 is almost certainly an underestimate because 
in 1983 the 4 week training question was only asked of employees under 50, whereas in all subsequent 
years it was asked of employees over 50 and under 65 as well. However, even if the training measure is 
calculated as the proportion of employees aged under 50 receiving training in every year, the figure for 
1983 is still lower than for 1984. 
39 The change of training propensity over a given period. can be decomposed into a within-industry and 




i S T T S T ∑ ∑ ∆ + ∆ = ∆  where T = proportion of workers 
undertaking training, S = share of industry i in total employment, a bar denotes a mean over time and 
the delta is the difference over the same two time periods.    31
is consistent with the findings of other papers which have found that the 
aggregate growth of education or occupational skills is essentially a within 
industry phenomenon (e.g. Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). 
 
 

























































LFS also has further information on the type of training received (although not 
all of these are asked in each year). For example, the questionnaire 
distinguishes between “on-the-job” training (e.g. learning by example and 
practice while doing the job) and “off-the-job” training (training conducted as a 
formal training course). Whilst the incidence of on-the-job training reported in 
the LFS has been more or less constant since the mid-1980s, the proportion 
of workers receiving some off-the-job training in the 4 weeks prior to being 
surveyed rose from about 5% in 1984 to 8% in the early 1990s. Other 
indicators of training (not asked in every year) include the duration of training, 
whether it was employer funded, whether it was completed or still ongoing. 
We examined whether there were differential productivity effects for all these 




                                                                                                                             
 
40 The measure or training used takes no account of the intensity or length of the training course (except 
insofar as a longer training course is more likely to fall within the 4-week period prior to the survey). 
There is some evidence that the length of training has been falling since the later 1980s (for a detailed 
analysis see Felstead et. al. (1997)). However, when we estimate training effects separately for each 
year of the LFS sample, the magnitude of the training effect does not differ significantly over time.  
One might expect a decrease in the productivity effect of the training measure for the later years if the 
average quality of training courses has declined (there was no evidence of this in our data).   32
 
The second major dataset we use is the Annual Census of Production 
(ACOP). This gives production statistics on capital, labour and output for 
industries in the manufacturing, energy and water sectors (collectively known 
as the production sector of the economy). It is based on the ARD (Annual 
Respondents Database) which is a survey of all production establishments 
(plants) in the UK with 100 or more employees, plus a subset of 
establishments with less than 100 employees. We use the COP data on value 
added, gross output, investment, employment and wages for industries in the 
manufacturing sector and the energy and water industries.   
 
Capital stocks were calculated using the perpetual inventory method drawing 
on NIESR’s estimates on initial capital stocks (see O’Mahony and Oulton, 
1990). All the nominal measures were deflated with three digit industry price 
indices from ONS. For the services industries we drew on the ISDB 
(InterSectoral DataBase) compiled by the OECD.  
 
There was a change in SIC classification in 1992 which forced us to 
aggregate some of the industries and prevented us from using some of the 
industries after the change. Additionally, we insisted on having at least 25 
individuals in each cell in each year. After matching the aggregated individual 
data from LFS we were left with 94 industry groupings over (a maximum of) 
14 years
41 (85 in the production sectors) 
 
Means of the variables are given in Table A1 broken down by high and low 
training sectors.  
 
A.2 Calculating the Training Stock 
The main results use the flow in training, but we also report some experiments 
with an estimate of the stock of trained workers in an industry. If we define the 
stock of people who have been trained in the industry at time t as N
T
t and the 
flow as M
T
t then if the stock evolves according to the standard perpetual 
inventory formula it can be expressed as: 
 




t   + (1-δ) N
T
t-1                                                                                            
 
where δ is the rate at which the stock of effectively trained workers at time t 
decay in their productive usefulness by t+1. This training depreciation rate 
represents several things. First, individuals will move away from the industry, 
so their training can no longer contribute to the industry’s human capital stock. 
Second, the usefulness of training will decline over time as old knowledge 
becomes obsolete and people forget (e.g. knowledge of the DOS operating 
system). Third to the extent that training is firm-specific, turnover between 
firms in the same industry may reduce industry productivity. Although we 
obtain some measures of turnover using the LFS, the second element of 
depreciation is essentially unknown. Because of this uncertainty our baseline 
results simply use the proportion of workers trained in an industry (TRAIN in 
                                            
41 Full details on how the data was set can be obtained from the authors or in Dearden, Reed and Van 
Reenen (2000).   33
equation (3)). This will be equal to the stock when δ=1. Nevertheless, we also 
estimate the training stock. We used the average worker turnover rate as one 
element of depreciation and then added an extra “exogenous element” 
varying between 0.2 and 0.6. We also need to make an assumption over the 
initial stock in 1983. We assume that the steady state growth (g) rate of the 
training stock is 2% per annum which enables a first year approximation of the 
stock as M
T




A.3 Firm Level Data 
The firm level data is based on the “Survey on Human Resource Practices 
and Corporate Value in the Modern Corporation” conducted in 1996 by Martin 
Conyon (See Conyon and Reed, 1999). The relevant training variable was 
q23f  “How have the following training strategies used by your company 
changed between 1990 and 1995…The percentage of company sales 
turnover spent on training has increased/decreased/not changed”. 135 firms 
gave some response to this question. We matched this survey to company 
accounting data from Datastream (data between 1968 and 1997). We 
discarded firms with missing values on the training and accounting variables 
leaving us with a sample of 119 companies. 
 
Productivity was measured by real sales (Datastream Item 104) per worker 
(Item 219). Capital is the historical book value (Item 330) and wages were 
estimated as total remuneration (Item 215) divided by the number of workers 
(Item 219). All accounts are consolidated. 
                                            
42 See the discussion around Table 3 Row 2 in the main text. We also considered looking at 
the inflows of trained workers from other industries to improve the stock measure, but the LFS 
sample of industry switchers was too small to construct the full three digit flow matrix.   34
 
Table A1 
Means of Variables by High and Low Training Industries 
Variable  Mean (low training 
industries)
Mean (high training 
industries)
proportion of male employees  62.4% 80.9%
proportion aged: 16-24  22.7% 15.5%
                          : 25-34  24.5% 25.4%
                          : 35-44  22.2% 24.0%
                          : 45-54  19.1% 22.1%
                          : 55-64  11.1% 12.8%
proportion in occupation: 
      :professional/managerial  14.7% 27.1%
      :clerical  8.5% 10.9%
      :personal/security  1.9% 1.6%
      :salesforce/technical  3.4% 2.5%
      :other occupations  71.5% 58.0%
highest qualification: 
      :degree  2.6% 7.3%
      :sub-degree level  3.7% 9.2%
      :A level / equivalent  15.5% 22.5%
      :O level/ equivalent  15.6% 14.3%
      :other/none/missing  62.7% 46.7%
tenure in current job: 
      :less than 6 months  10.9% 7.1%
      :6 months – 1 year  8.4% 5.8%
      :1 year – 2 years  11.1% 8.0%
      :2 years – 5 years   21.6% 17.8%
      :5 years – 10 years  18.8% 19.7%
      :10 years – 20 years   18.0% 24.3%
      :more than 20 years  9.0% 16.5%
proportion in small firm  21.2% 12.6%
average log capital-labour ratio  2.22 3.02
average log real value added per 
worker 
2.76 3.19
average log gross output per worker  3.80 4.27
average log hourly wages  1.56 1.84
average hours worked  39.1 40.2





`High Training’ industries are those that trained on average more than 8.7% of 
employees (the sample median).   35
Appendix B – additional Results 
 
B1. Some firm level results 
As a preliminary investigation of the impact of training on productivity we 
turned to the only UK dataset we know of that combines training data and 
objective productivity measures at the firm level. We constructed this by 
combining a firm survey with company accounting data from Datastream (see 
Data Appendix for details). We estimated an OLS production function in long 
differences (1995-1990) with results summarized in Table B1. The drawback 
of the firm level training data is we only know whether a firm increased the 
percentage of turnover allocated to training over this time period and not the 
actual quantitative change, so the table is simply illustrative. 
 
The first and second columns of Table B1 give results for productivity and the 
third and fourth columns have the results for wages. The second and fourth 
columns condition on industry dummies. In columns (1) and (3) the indicator 
for the change in training is positively and significantly associated with both 
productivity changes and with wage changes. Interestingly, the magnitude of 
the association with productivity is about twice as large as the magnitude of 
the association with wages. We uncovered a similar finding when we 
examined the industry level data
43. A second feature of Table B1 is that much 
of the association between training, productivity and wages is due to industry 
level (growth) effects. The coefficient on training falls by half in the productivity 
regression when sector dummies are added (column 2) and by three quarters 
in the wage equation (column 4). The training effects are no longer significant. 
This implies that a substantial element of the training correlation is due to 
industry growth effects. It is these changes over a much longer time period 
that we exploited in the main part of the paper
44.  
 
B2. More detailed industry results 
Table B2 reports the unrestricted coefficient estimates underlying Table 2 in 
the main text and the restricted estimates of the production function 
parameters after imposing the COMFAC restrictions. If we took the 
unrestricted coefficients our preferred models in columns (1) and (4) would 
suggest a larger magnitude of the long-run impact of training on productivity
45 
(2.289) of training on wages (1.215). The qualitative finding that the 
productivity effect is twice the size of the wage effect remains unaltered. 
 
 
                                            
43 Given the size of the sample, it is not surprising that the difference in training coefficients is not 
significant (p-value=.23, allowing for cross equation correlation of the errors through SUR). 
44 In the spirit of looking for complementarities (Ichinowski et al, 1997) we investigated allowing for 
interactions between changes in training and changes in many other features of the firm – merit pay 
across four different skill groups, employee involvement, retention, flexibility, three types of 
delayering, share options, teamwork, competition, etc. With the exception of merit pay for managers 
(which was significant at the 10% level) none of these interactions were statistically significant. It is 
worth noting that neither Black and Lynch (1997) nor Bartel (1995) find strong evidence of such 
interactions in their data. 
45 i.e. using  ) 1 /( ) ( 1 3 2 π π π − +  in the context of equation (14).   36
Table B1: Training, Productivity and Wages at the firm level 
Long-differences 1995-1990 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Mean change in ln(Sales per worker)  Mean change in ln(Average Wage) 
Growth in 
























No Yes  No Yes 
     
Observations  119 119 119 119 
R
2  .41 .62 .22 .63 
 
Notes 
Estimation by OLS in long differences (average 1995-1990); robust standard errors under coefficients. All 
regressions include controls for the growth in employment and whether there was an increase in the proportion of 
skills (4 groups: managers, clerical, skilled manual, unskilled manual), of females, and of part timers. These are all 
continuous variables. “Growth in Training as a percentage of turnover” is a dummy variable indicating whether 
training grew as a percentage of turnover between 1990 and 1995. 
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Table B2: Detailed GMM results 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Ln(real value added per worker)  Ln(Wages) 
Constrained – COMFAC Imposed 
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levels equations. 
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levels equations. 
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These report a fuller set of results than those in Table 2 (which correspond to the first and last columns of Table 
B2). Estimation by GMM-SYS in Arellano and Bond (1998) DPD-98 package written in GAUSS; all regressions 
include the current values of all the variables in Table 2 columns (3) and (6) (i.e. turnover, other occupations, 
qualifications, age, tenure, gender, region, firm size and time dummies). Capital intensity, training, hours and 
lagged productivity are always treated as endogenous. The other variables are assumed weakly exogenous. One 
step standard errors (robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and autocorrelation) in parentheses under 
coefficients; LM1(2) is a Lagrange Multiplier test of first (second) order serial correlation distributed N[1,0] 
under the null (see Arellano and Bond, 1991); Sargan is a Chi-squared test of the over-identifying restrictions; 
observations weighted by number of individuals in an LFS industry cell. 
   39
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